Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

ferent, but are both defending the same continuities of experience in different forms of words.

There are other criticisms in the article in question, but, as this seems the most vital one, I will for the present, at any rate, leave them untouched.

WILLIAM JAMES.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

University of California Publications. Philosophy. Volume I. Studies in Philosophy prepared in Commemoration of the Seventieth Birthday of Professor George Holmes Howison. Berkeley. The University Press. November 29, 1904.

This volume is beautifully executed, and its essays are all of solid merit. Dealing as they do with diverse topics, it will be best to take up each in turn very briefly.

The first paper is entitled *The Summum Bonum,* by Professor McGilvary. "Before discussing the question of the nature of the highest good we must first ascertain what is meant by 'good' in the positive degree." But 'good' is an ambiguous term. Sometimes it means the 'pleasant'; sometimes, the 'desired.' Sometimes, the desirable in the sense of 'that which we should desire if all the consequences of all the different lines of conduct open to us were actually exercising on us an impulsive force proportioned to the desires or aversions which they would excite if actually experienced' (what the author calls the 'teleologically desirable'). Sometimes it means the desirable, not in the sense that we now do, or ever will desire it, but in the sense that we 'feel that we *should* desire it' (the 'categorically desirable'). Besides all these meanings, the good may mean, 'not the obligation to *desire* the object, but the obligation to *attain* the object without reference to desire' (the 'categorically obligatory').

"Having thus discovered so many meanings for the term 'good,' we should be prepared to find as many meanings for the term 'highest good' or *summum bonum.* And this is exactly what we do find." Along with this conception of the highest good there goes a sense of obligation to strive to attain it, the 'good' and the 'obligatory' being identical only in the last of the uses of the term above enumerated.

'We are now prepared to take up the question whether there is any *reasonable highest good* for men at large.' From the individualistic point of view none can be asserted. But from the point of view of the social nature of the individual 'all normal men do have at heart the good of some other beings than themselves,' and this common good becomes identified with the individual good. In this sense only is there a highest good.

The second paper, by Professor Mezes is a discussion of *The Essentials of Human Faculty.* It is a statement of the principal reasons for the human ascendency, the chief of which on the mental side is the 'ability to decide among alternatives.'

He distinguishes three general types of novel action. 'The first is action by trial and error, . . . the second, action that is purposive but not chosen, the third, action that is purposive and chosen.' Animals share with man in the capacity for the first two kinds of action. Man alone is capable of the remaining type.

'Animals ask single or simple questions, but do not ask double, complex, or general questions.' 'They *see* fitting means, but do not *seek* them; and seeking means implies the general question.' 'In brief, animals are capable of asking questions which do not involve the presence of several alternatives in their minds at once, but appear to be quite incapable of asking questions which do involve such mental alternatives.' 'The perception of relations is the distinctive human power.'

He connects the evolution of this power in a very interesting way with the evolution of the hand and of the erect stature. 'Volitional effort,' he says, 'which makes possible choice, our original differentia, turns out to be the psychic correspondent, gradually preserved and organized, of the physical strains and stresses incident to erectness.' Erectness is 'the matrix from which issued the germ of volitional effort.'

One questionable position is that in which the author says that effort is 'an additional weight the self can drop into the ideal scale prior to decision, an increment of force that may well, in the case of difficult actions, be used so to reinforce muscular energy as to render possible what muscular energy unaided could never have accomplished.' This appears to the reviewer to labor under the same limitations as Professor James's theory of the will upon which it is based—to be, in fact, a bit of antiquated faculty psychology in the midst of an otherwise illuminating organic and functional statement.

The third paper, on *Some Scientific Apologies for Evil,* by Professor Stratton, rejects the current 'attempts to justify moral evil by an appeal to natural science.' The 'law of contrast,' according to which evil is necessary as a foil or background for the good, is rejected on the ground that 'the law of contrast does not demand that actual evil should coexist with the good.' 'The mere idea of evil is a sufficient contrast,' and 'the idea or thought of evil is not itself an evil.' 'It seems as if the thought of moral evil could have been suggested perhaps even by the behavior of animals.' In any case, 'it does not appear that the evil which we actually find is indispensable to our consciousness of the good.'

Nor is evil simply good in the making, or 'lower stages of development when viewed from above.' A vigorous tree, a beautiful bird, an intelligent horse does not seem evil simply because it is lower in the evolutionary scale. A child does not seem evil because it is immature. There is no identity between the undeveloped and the bad. Professor Stratton even goes so far as to suggest that moral evolution is possible without evil, and says that we must return to the conviction 'that the truest revelation of God's character comes, not through nature or natural evolution, but by some inner light, some inner voice.' The argument is not convincing.

Professor Rieber in the fourth paper, on *Pragmatism and the A priori,* has stated clearly one or two important principles of pragmatism and misstated others; or, at least, the reviewer thinks that the pragmatists themselves will regard them as misstatements. There is great need just at this time of a clear definition of the issues here involved.

The author's main contention is for an *a priori,* eternal or absolute element in experience, and especially in knowledge. 'Not what an idea has come from, nor what it is just now discovered to be, nor what it is going to *do* by and by, but what it eternally *is,* must furnish us with our deepest insight into the world of reality.' Therefore he objects to the appeal to evolution upon which he conceives the pragmatist to rest his case. 'Mind, which the pragmatist puts last in the evolutional series, is in the profoundest sense of the word first.' Hence the necessity of 'rising above the temporal order to a timeless point of view.' Likewise he objects to pragmatism as a pure empiricism, because he conceives that 'the pragmatist announces at the outset that thought, being a function in the present situation, exhausts its entire meaning in that situation,' whereas in truth, he says, 'we do have knowledge that is logically prior to experience,' which 'is itself the condition of experience, and therefore can not be derived from experience.' 'What meaning,' he asks, 'can we possibly attach to the pragmatist's conception of reality, that, as a whole, changes always? If he does not wish us to take him literally and after all intends to provide for some sort of permanence, how can he give his world of fluent inherited ideas any stability of meaning?'

In reply to this it might be asked what is meant by permanence and by change. If idealism insists on a permanent element in a static sense, then pragmatism is not idealistic, since it maintains that permanence means permanence in the midst of change, a moving equilibrium in which the stability of a gyroscope or the life of an organism may serve as the type. But is idealism necessarily synonymous with absolutism?

A similar line of argument would show that pragmatism is not necessarily identified with a pure empiricism, as the author thinks it is. He says: 'The path along which empirical thought moves can not be marked out except by reference to some fixed point of view that lies outside of that path.' This the pragmatist denies. A 'fixed' point of view, he says, is no point of view at all. A point of view is a developing thing. It is fixed, that is, it is taken as relatively fixed, only for the given situation, but is itself constantly undergoing evolution with the development of experience. This is empiricism, but it is not mere empiricism; it is not sheer relativism. As the author himself puts it in his exposition of the pragmatist's position, 'Even if all is flux and our conceptions of the true, the beautiful and the right are always changing, we need not despair. We must not think that we are thereafter consigned hopelessly to the quagmire of uncertainty and error. The discovery that nothing is stable need not paralyze action.'

The author further objects that 'pragmatism emphasizes effects of action as tests of validity, but does not furnish a criterion by means of which we may distinguish good from bad effects.' The reply might be made that the pragmatist finds the criterion in the social implications of the consciousness of the individual. The pragmatist says, 'Our thoughts are born of our needs.' But in saying that he does not deny that these needs themselves need to be explained. To explain them is the sociogenetic problem. The pragmatist simply insists on basing his philosophy of life in the most obvious truths of experience and then working out from this as a basis to the consideration of the terminal problems.

The author objects to the 'genetic theory of the judgment,' upon which he says the pragmatist bases his entire logic. 'Aside from being a useful instrument in the struggle for existence,' he says, thought 'has the more important office simply to be true.' 'It is one function of a judgment to be useful, that is, to reach out beyond itself. But its other and most fundamental function is just to be true.' But surely truth is true only under specific conditions. There is no such thing as truth at large or truth in the abstract. And the specification of the conditions always introduces the possibility, nay, the necessity, of elements of utility.

He links what he calls the 'action-theory of thought' of the pragmatist with the James-Lange theory of the emotions. 'We do not act because we think, but we think because we act.' He is unable to see that both are true. He points his criticism with an illustration. 'The light in an electric globe may be said to stand midway between the current that goes in and the current that goes out of the globe. It represents a stage in the process. Now suppose the outgoing current of electricity did some work,—turned a motor, for example. The light then would be in inseparable connection with this activity. We could appropriately speak of it as a function of the action in the motor. The light, however, does not turn the motor, it is a mere attendant phenomenon in the process. Now in the action-theory of thought, the idea occupies an analogous position.' The terms of this illustration show how completely the author has missed the gist of pragmatism. From the standpoint of a strict continuity, light has existence solely in terms of vibrations (or whatever change the physicist regards as the objective counterpart of the experience of light), and in this sense 'light' does play its part in relation to the turning of the motor, at least negatively, in diverting energy that would otherwise be available for turning the motor. It is not a mere 'attendant phenomenon' in the process. The pragmatist is not committed to epiphenomenalism. One of the main contributions of a true pragmatism is to get back of the dualism implied in that theory.

Instead of its being true that pragmatism must 'stand or fall with the Spencerian agnosticism,' it is the case rather that in pragmatism we for the first time see evolution in its true setting. He is the first to take the evolution principle really seriously. Spencer's philosophy, in spite of its pretensions, never really penetrated to the real significance of evolution, as is sufficiently shown, not only by his doctrine of the unknowable, but also, as Professor Royce has recently shown, in his formal statement of the evolution principle itself. Pragmatism is no more bound up with Spencerism than it is with Hegelism.

Finally, the author falls into the error, common to nearly all of the recent critics of pragmatism, of supposing that this doctrine is committed to subjective idealism and individualism, and therefore that it is 'a protest against every species of ontology.' But identification of the logical with the ontological categories, the notion of a reciprocal determination of thought and reality, does not necessarily imply a denial of the ontological categories; it simply means protest against a certain kind of ontology.

Professor Bakewell, in the fifth paper, defends idealism against pragmatism, which he calls the *Latter-Day Flowing-philosophy.* This philosophy, he says, justly emphasizes 'the universality of the dynamic standpoint, the concrete character of experience, and its inevitable anthropocentric reading. But idealism is not thereby routed; in intellect still is found the organizing principle that makes experience intelligible; but it is intellect conceived as immanent in the process of experience, and not merely transcendent. And, inasmuch as the fixed standard is found in the life of the individual knower, the result is, to use Professor Howison's phrase, personal idealism.' This passage sets forth clearly enough the author's position. A single point will be taken up for criticism.

The true is that which works. The good is that which satisfies. This is pragmatism. But is there anything, the author asks, which might not under conceivable circumstances meet the requirements of this criterion? May we not conceive a situation in which what we now call the false and the evil would give satisfaction because it serves the utilitarian ends of the moment? If so, what becomes of the distinction between the true and the false, the good and the evil?

But is not this as if a carpenter should refuse to use his gauging instrument to mark a straight line because he had heard that parallel lines meet at infinity? No doubt there are circumstances under which it would be right to do what from our present point of view we call lying, stealing, or committing murder, but this admission does not destroy the existence or the validity of the standards which govern my present conduct. The admission of the ultimately hedonistic and utilitarian character of our criteria does not necessarily result in subjectivism and scepticism. Pragmatism is not mere individualism.

Our desires and our needs are socially determined, have a social content, and a social validity. Truth and utility have a social stability. And this sort of stability is permanent and trustworthy because an organic expression of the social character of the consciousness of the individual. Here is a genuine and practicable standard because it represents a dynamic equilibrium or balance of the actual conditions within which the individual must work out his freedom. It is no spurious and abstract validity, no pseudo-stasis of a transcendental sort, won at the price of denying all the rich diversity of concrete experience. It is in terms of experience, as the author himself says, that the standard must be stated, and this means, as he does not seem fully to realize, that the standard can not be 'fixed,' and that it is as much social as it is individual, that it is only by being social that it can be truly individual.

The sixth paper, by Professor Henderson, on *Some Problems in Evolution and Education,* is a valuable one. 'Two conceptions, springing from the study of the process of organic evolution, are especially significant from their bearing on the theory of education.' These are the significance of infancy, and the opinion that acquired characters are not inherited.

The prolongation of infancy is to secure increased plasticity in the individual organism in order to adapt it in the increasingly variable conditions which accompany the greater complexity of structure in the higher stages of evolution. 'A stage of infancy can have no function except to prepare for unpredictable changes in which the former generation is unable to survive.' Hence the education of the human infant should be 'directed largely to the task of developing an ability that can be used in all emergencies rather than to the formation of specific habits.' Society finds in the helplessness of its infants the freedom that is the parent of progress.

If this is true 'we do not care very much whether there is any inheritance of acquired characters.' 'The more variable the environments the more likely will it be that the habits adapted to one condition will be useless, or positively an encumbrance, later on. Hence we might expect that the evolution of organisms adapted to more and more complex and variable environments, would mean the evolution of the non-inheritance of acquired characters.' The purpose of reproduction is to secure diversity. 'Heredity preserves continuity where reproduction assails it.' Prolongation of infancy and non-inheritance of acquired characters are thus the methods by which such discontinuity is brought about in evolution as is requisite to insure this diversity of structure and function involved in all progress. And social heredity, or education, is the consciously directed means of transmitting the accumulated wisdom of the race without the blindness and rigidity of physical heredity. The law of conscious selection, fitting the weak to survive, carries evolution to a level higher than the mere blind struggle for existence with the survival of the fittest, which is the law of natural selection.

The seventh paper, on *Philosophy and Science in the Study of Education,* by Principal Burks, points out the looseness in the current phrases, 'Science of Education' and 'Philosophy of Education,' as applied to even the best systematic thought in this field. In the strict sense of these terms, as he defines them, there is no 'science' and no 'philosophy' of education. But he pleads for a more thoroughly rational philosophy of life and conduct as the basis for true educational theory. As he suggestively states the matter, 'education is merely human life under the influence of conditions and stimuli artificially instead of naturally selected. By reason of this intimate correspondence between the educational process and the normal social life of man, the fundamental problems of education are identical with those of life in its larger aspect, and the philosophy of education is nothing less than the philosophy of life.'

The eighth paper, by Professor Lovejoy, on *The Dialectic of Bruno and Spinoza,* is an able exposition and estimate of the contradictory elements which go to make up Spinoza's system. He traces back the contradiction in Spinoza's conception between the unity and the multiplicity, the transcendence and the immanence, of the divine substance, to a similar dialectic in neo-Platonism and in Bruno. He shows at once the justice and the injustice of the diverse interpretations by Sir Frederick Pollock and Mr. Joachim, on the one hand, who expound Spinoza in a highly idealistic fashion, and of E. Caird and J. Caird, on the other, who fail to recognize the common root of the antitheses inherent in Spinoza's thought, and thus make him out more illogical than he really is. The author's own view is that it is necessary for the proper understanding of this philosopher to keep in mind 'the origin of both sides of the contradiction in a single dialectical ground, and hence the impossibility, for Spinoza, of unequivocally giving up either side, without abandoning his whole method of philosophizing.'

The ninth paper, by Professor Stuart, is entitled *The Logic of Self-realization.* "The notion of the 'concrete universal' in modern philosophy . . . is, first and foremost and in its essence, an ethical conception." The author shows that in the development of the 'explicit ethics of the concrete universal—the theory of Self-realization—the idea of derivation has for the most part been construed in a metaphysical fashion, according to the letter of rationalism, and hence misconstrued—with the result that the ideal of a completely realized self has been understood on the analogy of the rationalist's substance, as a source and origin of particular moral guidance in details.' He, on the other hand, holds 'that the ideal thus understood is as useless for any such practical purpose—for any purpose of ethical theory, that is to say—as the metaphysical concept of the concrete universal is tacitly confessed to be by its expounders for the purposes of factual science.' The true significance of the self-realization principle lies in its consideration as 'essentially an ideal of ethical method, and not a contentual or descriptive ideal from which either the details or the generalities of right conduct are to be extracted.'

Dr. de Laguna in the tenth paper, on *Utility and the Accepted Type,* starts from the common distinction between ethical judgments based upon conformity to the accepted type of what is right and wrong, and judgments based upon utility or the interest or indifference which the agent displays toward the common good. 'How can judgments so pronouncedly different in nature bear the same generic name' ('ethical')? 'The time has passed for answering . . . simply by denying the ethical character of either of the main factors involved.' By a very instructive comparison with similar judgments in the esthetic sphere, the author shows that the 'two classes of moral judgment are allied in a continuous common development.' 'The type-judgment and the act which follows it can not be understood by any abstract analysis that leaves out of account their genetic connection with consideration of utility.' That is, utility and conformity are alike essential as the progressive and the conservative elements in the moral life.

The eleventh paper, by Dr. Dunlap, is entitled *A Theory of the Syllogism.* The ordinary classification of propositions is not exhaustive as regards their forms. He substitutes the classification into simple and complex, the latter being subdivided into specific hypothetical, specific disjunctive, general hypothetical and general disjunctive. After illustrating what he means by these terms, he shows how they are combined in the syllogism, which he defines as 'an interrelation of two judgments summed up in a third judgment.' His mode of symbolizing the relations of the propositions in the syllogism is in some respects new, and will be of interest to the formal logician.

The twelfth and last paper, by Dr. Overstreet, on *The Basal Principle of Truth-evaluation,* is an attempt to give positive character to the test by inconceivability of the opposite. The first part of the paper is devoted to a restatement of the dialectic of universal scepticism. His own positive conclusion is 'that the truth of any content whatever lies in the ability of that content to maintain itself completely.' 'Truth is an absolute uniformity or self-maintenance of meaning.'

H. HEATH BAWDEN.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

The Principles of Mathematical Physics. HENRI POINCARÉ. *The Monist,* January, 1905, Vol. XV., No. 1, pp. 1–25.

This article is an address delivered before the St. Louis Congress, translated by Professor Halsted. To review it here, when recourse to either the original or the translation can be had so easily, would not be worth while, did it not contain matter of philosophical interest not made explicit by the author, and yet very *à propos* to the recent frequent discussions of pragmatism. The author's general position is well known to many; yet it may be well to restate this.[1] For him the axioms of geometry are neither synthetic judgments *a priori* nor experimental facts, but rather conventions, definitions. Our choice among them remains free, and is limited only by the necessity of avoiding all contradiction.

The foundation of mechanics is closely similar, yet with a difference. Although the fundamental principles of geometry are conventions set up in studying space, because of experiments in physiology and mechanics, they do not refer to the objects experimented with. The principles of mechanics *do,* however, relate to these objects, and that science must remain experimental. The author views such hypotheses in physical science as that matter is continuous or that it is atomic as indifferent. This ought to be most critically suggestive to him who claims that, corresponding to, *e. g.,* atomic (molecular) formulæ, real atoms must exist. The real aim of the scientist is not to find out whether, *e. g.,* the ether is or is not formed of atoms, but to foresee optical phenomena. The differential equations by which he does this express relations; the former are true if the latter preserve their reality. We may *image* the relation by substituting for the equation some appellation like movement or current, but 'the real objects will remain eternally hidden from us.' If, then, between the members of different sets of images the same relations respectively exist as between the objects, one is free to choose his imagery. The differential equation is then an abstraction presenting the common features of, *e. g.,* periodic phenomena, some of which may be those of motion,

---

[1] Cf. 'La Science et l'Hypothèse,' Paris, 1903.